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We used a time perception task to study the effects of the subjective experience of control
on emotion and cognitive processing. This task is uniquely sensitive to the emotionality
of the stimuli: high-arousing negative stimuli are perceived as lasting longer than high-
arousing positive events, while the opposite pattern is observed for low-arousing stimuli.
We evaluated the temporal distortions of emotionally charged events in non-anxious (Exper-
iments 1 and 5) and spider-fearful individuals (Experiments 2–4). Participants were shown
images of varying durations between 400 and 1600 ms and were asked to report if the
perceived duration of the image seemed closer to a short (400 ms) or to a long (1600 ms)
standard duration. Our results replicate previous findings showing that the emotional con-
tent of the image modulated the perceived duration of that image. More importantly, we
studied whether giving participants the illusion that they have some control over the emo-
tional content of the images could eliminate this temporal distortion. Results confirmed
this hypothesis, even though our participant population was composed of highly reac-
tive emotional individuals (spider-fearful) facing fear-related images (spiders). Further, we
also showed that under conditions of little-to-no control, spider-fearful individuals perceive
temporal distortions in a distinct manner from non-anxious participants: the duration of
events was entirely determined by the valence of the events, rather than by the typical
valence× arousal interaction. That is, spider-fearful participants perceived negative events
as lasting longer than positive events, regardless of their level of arousal. Finally, we also
showed that under conditions of cognitive dissonance, control can eliminate temporal dis-
tortions of low arousal events, but not of high-arousing events, providing an important
boundary condition to the otherwise positive effects of control on time estimation.
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INTRODUCTION
It is agreed that the feeling of control that we experience over exter-
nal events in the world and over our behaviors, thoughts, emotions,
cognitions and beliefs, fosters mental health, physical health, and is
hence crucial for evolutionary survival (e.g., Shapiro et al., 1996).
This feeling of wellbeing arises from a complex interaction involv-
ing psychological, psycho-sociological, and biological factors, that
altogether foster mental health, physical health, and psychosocial
functioning (Lefcourt, 1973; Langer and Rodin, 1976; Bandura,
1977; Thompson,1981; Burger,1985;Wiedenfeld et al.,1990;Arm-
field and Mattiske, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1996; Bandura et al., 2003;
Leotti et al., 2010; Allman and Meck, 2012). Importantly, this sub-
jective experience of control is not necessarily related to an actual
causal control over the world (Langer, 1975). A consistent finding
across different species (e.g., humans, non-human primates, rats,
dogs, for a review, see Lefcourt, 1973) is that the perception of
control can alter the aversive quality of an external stressor (e.g.,
Glass et al., 1969). Recently, it was suggested that the perception of
control plays a critical role in regulating the emotional response
triggered by environmental stressors, in such a way that it buffers
our emotional reactions to aversive stimuli (Leotti et al., 2010;
Mereu and Lleras, in press). In the present report, we tested this
hypothesis in a highly reactive emotional group of participants
(sub-clinical spider-fearful individuals) within the context of a
time perception task. Because it is well known that the emotional
content of an event influences how long we experience that event
(e.g., Angrilli et al., 1997; Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Smith et al.,
2011), we evaluated whether having a feeling of control over emo-
tional and fear-related events altered the manner in which those
events were experienced.
EXPERIENCING ILLUSORY CONTROL OVER EXTERNAL EVENTS
People like to believe that their choices or actions affect the events
around them, even in uncontrollable situations (a phenomenon
referred to as the illusion of control by Langer, 1975; see also Pres-
son and Benassi, 1996 for a meta-analytical review). For example,
one may push several times the elevator “call” button and as a
result may feel that the elevator arrived sooner because of one’s
actions. This feeling is also evidenced in superstitious behavior
(e.g., Skinner, 1948). A feeling of control can be experienced when
outcomes (i.e., events in the world) are entirely independent of
one’s choices, provided that the person concerned is sufficiently
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motivated to achieve the outcome and that the desired outcome
occurs often (Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Alloy and Abramson, 1979;
Thompson, 1999). For instance, in an experiment a person may be
given a choice between two keys (key 1 or 2) and one of two out-
comes (happy or sad face) may occur after their keypress. Imagine
a situation in which participants are asked to press buttons 1 and
2 in such a way as to maximize the occurrence of happy faces.
If a happy face appears 75% of the time, irrespective of the but-
ton chosen, participants will report having had control (though
not perfect) over the outcome. If on the other hand, a happy face
occurs rarely (e.g., 25% of the time), they will report having little-
to-no control over the events. This belief that one’s actions impact
the world in probabilistic or deterministic fashion is very common
(Taylor and Brown, 1994; Presson and Benassi, 1996; Thompson,
1999), and occurs as soon as one is given the opportunity to exert
a choice and is put in a position of being an active agent in a sit-
uation (Langer, 1975; Langer and Rodin, 1976; Thompson, 1999;
Leotti et al., 2010). Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) considered the
illusion of control as being a “positive” illusion (or cognitive bias)
that promotes individual’s wellbeing by fostering, for instance,
good copying strategies, high motivation in various aspect of the
life, high productivity, and positive social exchanges.
BENEFITS OF PERCEIVED CONTROL OVER EXTERNAL STRESSORS
A feeling of control over an external stressor has substantial benefi-
cial effects on the period preceding the occurrence of the external
stressor (Stotland and Blumenthal, 1964; Geer et al., 1970; Geer
and Maisel, 1972; Gatchel and Proctor, 1976). For instance, par-
ticipants that were provided with a feeling of control showed
decreased physiological arousal and reported less discomfort and
less anxiety compared to participants that were not given a feeling
of control in the period preceding the administration of a painful
stimulation (e.g., electric shocks, loud tones, Geer et al., 1970;
Gatchel and Proctor, 1976), the presentation of high-arousing neg-
ative images (Geer and Maisel, 1972), and the administration of
a series of tests (Stotland and Blumenthal, 1964). See Thompson
(1981) for a review of different methods used to study the effects
of perceived control on aversive stimulation.
Most remarkable, compared to participants that were not given
any feeling of control over stressful situations, participants pro-
vided with a feeling of control over the stressors showed better
performance on later cognitive tasks (puzzle solving and proof-
reading tasks) that did not involve any manipulations of control
nor any stressors (Glass et al., 1969). This type of long-lasting bene-
fits of perceived control over stressful events has also been shown in
animals. In rats, experiencing heightened levels of control during
aversive events can increase emotional resilience to future social-
stressors that are themselves uncontrollable. For example, rats that
learned to turn the wheel for a specific amount of turns to escape a
series of electric shocks and that 7 days later were faced with social-
stress (i.e., confronted with an alpha male rat) handled the stress
much like rats that were never electrocuted: they showed a nor-
mal rate of defeat/submission behaviors. In comparison, rats that
were not given the possibility to escape the electric shocks showed
an abnormal increase of defeat/submission behaviors when facing
the alpha male rat (Amat et al., 2010). Finally, studies on monkeys
showed that control helps to reduce the negative lasting impact of
previous stressors on physical health (Weiss, 1971). Thus, expe-
riencing a sense of control over a potentially traumatic event
(electric shock) can provide a measure of psychological resilience
to future stressful events and diminish the sequelae of those events.
It is important to note that while the feeling of control seems to
have a strong influence on the period preceding the aversive event,
there are conflicting results as to whether it can actually alter the
perception of the aversive event itself: both increases and decreases
in physiological arousal in response to the aversive event have been
found when control was increased (e.g., Corah and Boffa, 1970;
Geer et al., 1970; Geer and Maisel, 1972; Gatchel and Proctor, 1976)
and no benefit has been observed in the overall estimation of pain
and stress (e.g., Pervin, 1963; Stotland and Blumenthal, 1964; Glass
et al., 1969). That said, participants that are given a feeling of con-
trol over a painful stimulus are willing to endure more painful
stimulation and show higher pain tolerance than those deprived
of a sense of control (e.g., Glass et al., 1969).
In sum, research that evaluated the impact of perceived control
on external stressors indicates that some aspects of the aversive
quality of the stimulus can be decreased by providing participants
with a feeling of control and the possibility to exert choice. This
indicates that the feeling of control may play an important role in
the cognitive reappraisal of aversive events. As proposed by Leotti
et al. (2010), we believe that having a sense of control over the aver-
sive events can provide a buffering effect on the otherwise strong
impact of emotion on our cognitive processes (see also Mereu and
Lleras, in press).
GOAL OF THE PRESENT STUDY
Here, we studied the impact of perceived control on one percep-
tual aspect of the aversive stimulation: its duration. We chose to
study time perception because it provides us with an experimental
platform to test the effects of the feeling of control on a cognitive
process that is uniquely sensitive to the emotionality of the event
being judged (e.g., Angrilli et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2011). Specif-
ically, when judging the duration of high-arousing events, people
perceive negative events (e.g., images of dismembered bodies) as
lasting longer than positive events (e.g., erotic images). When judg-
ing the duration of low-arousing events, people perceive negative
events (e.g., a dirty mop) as lasting shorter than positive events
(e.g., a pretty flower). In sum, time perception shows sensitivity to
both arousal and valence in a very distinct pattern, which we can
now leverage to study the impact of perceived control on emotional
processing. Moreover, the study of time perception is interesting
on its own right because these emotion-induced time distortions
can be frequently experienced in everyday life. For example, the
time spent waiting for a loved one seems longer than the one
spent with them. We also frequently experience daily events as
lasting overly long, when we are in a hurry and there are obstacles
in our way (e.g., traffic lights seem to take overly long to turn to
green). The goal of our research is to study whether the subjec-
tive feeling of control can alter these temporal distortion effects.
The rationale is that, if a feeling of control can buffer our cognition
from our emotional reactions to emotional events (see Leotti et al.,
2010; Mereu and Lleras, in press), then performance on the time
estimation task (a cognitive task) will no longer be influenced by
the emotionality of the images themselves.
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Here we use a time bisection task (Penney et al., 2008) to
evaluate temporal distortions elicited by emotional stimuli. In a
time bisection task, participants are initially taught to discrimi-
nate between two standard durations (one short and one long).
Then they are shown events of varying duration and asked to
judge whether the duration of the event is closer to the short
or to the long standard. This procedure allows one to estimate a
psychophysical curve relating the real duration of events to partic-
ipants’ perceived duration of that event (by plotting the likelihood
that a given event is perceived as more similar to the long standard).
One can compute separate psychophysical curves for different
types of events and thus estimate whether time is perceived dif-
ferently across those different types of events. The key measure
to compare these curves is the bisection point (BP): the point at
which participants are equally likely to report an event as being
more similar to the short or long standards. Let’s take as examples
high-arousing positive images and high-arousing negative images.
Typically, high-arousing negative images are perceived as lasting
longer than high-arousing positive images. In the psychophysical
curve, this means that for any given event duration, participants
are more likely to respond long for negative compared to pos-
itive high-arousing images. Therefore, the psychophysical curve
for the negative images is shifted to the left compared to that for
the positive images. Consequently, the BP for negative images is
smaller than the one for positive images. In other words, a smaller
BP indicates an earlier transition from events being perceived as
short to events being perceived as long, and therefore indicates an
overestimation of time in that condition.
Mereu and Lleras (in press) first tested the impact of per-
ceived control on the duration of high-arousing emotional events
by using images from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS images, Lang et al., 2008). Their results showed that under a
condition of low perceived control, participants evaluated negative
events as lasting longer than positive events (replicating Angrilli
et al.’s,1997 results),whereas participants under conditions of high
perceived (illusory) control experienced no temporal distortions.
Here, we aim to extend those initial findings in two important
directions: (1) we wanted to perform a stronger test of our hypoth-
esis by investigating whether this buffering effect of control on time
perception would also be observed in a highly emotionally reac-
tive population: spider-fearful participants confronted with spider
images; (2) we wanted to determine some of the boundaries of this
effect.
The overall structure of the paper is as follows. Experiment
1 replicates the temporal distortion effects typically observed in
non-anxious individuals, deprived of control, when faced with
emotional images, including a subset of spider images. We used
these results as a benchmark. Experiment 2 tested sub-clinical
spider-fearful individuals, also deprived of control, on the same
set of images. We observed large temporal distortions driven by
emotional content, though the pattern of temporal distortions
was different from that of non-anxious individuals. Experiment
3 was our critical experiment in which we tested the influ-
ence of high levels of control on time perception in this highly
reactive population. No time distortion effects were observed.
Experiment 4 provided an experimental control condition in
which spider-fearful individuals experience the same images as
those in Experiment 3, but were once again, deprived of any feel-
ing of control. Time distortions were again evident, replicating
Experiment 2. Finally, Experiment 5 tested whether high levels of
perceived control, alone, are sufficient to eliminate time distortion
effects. They are not: in a condition of high cognitive disso-
nance, non-anxious participants showed temporal distortions of
high-arousing events.
EXPERIMENT 1: 25% OF POSITIVE IMAGES – NON-ANXIOUS
INDIVIDUALS
We used a time bisection task to evaluate time distortion effects in
non-anxious individuals under conditions of low experienced con-
trol over the events. Participants were shown images that varied
along their arousal and valence dimensions. According to previ-
ous studies (Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Alloy and Abramson, 1979),
the subjective experience of control can be diminished by reduc-
ing the occurrence of a desired outcome. Thus, in Experiment 1,
we presented a high percentage of negative pictures (75%) and
instructed participants to try to minimize the occurrence of neg-
ative images by selecting one of two buttons at the beginning of
each trial. Importantly, the occurrence of pleasant and unpleasant
images was entirely independent of participants’ choices. Thus,
the sense of control over the events was not real, just illusory, and
given the low percentage of positive images, we anticipated partic-
ipants experiencing low levels of control over the emotionality of
the pictures.
The aim of this first experiment was to provide a replication
of previous findings in the time perception literature (Angrilli
et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2011) by using a new subset of pictures
(spiders) in addition to images taken from the IAPS (Lang et al.,
2008) in a group of normal, non-anxious, and non-spider-fearful
individuals. The IAPS pictures were categorized into three sets:
high-arousing positive, high-arousing negative, and low-arousing
positive. The spider images were expected to be judged as being
low-arousing and slightly negative or neutral by non-anxious
individuals (see Buetti et al., 2012). Thus, we expected that non-
anxious participants would overestimate the duration of high-
arousing negative images compared to arousal-matched positive
images (i.e., BP for negative images will be smaller than for posi-
tive images). Conversely, for low-arousing images, positive pictures
should be perceived as lasting longer than spider images (i.e., BPs
for positive images will be smaller than for negative images).
METHODS
Participants
Participants were students at the University of Illinois. Six-
teen non-anxious individuals (14 females, 2 males, mean age of
20.8 years, 1.9 of mean at the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire, FSQ)
participated in the study in exchange for one psychology course
credit. They were selected on the basis of their scores at the FSQ
(Szymanski and O’Donohue, 1995). All participants were naïve
regarding the selection criteria and questionnaires scores, and had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study was approved by
the university IRB board.
Stimuli and design
We used two types of stimuli to train participants to discrimi-
nate between two standard durations, that is, a short (400 ms) and
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a long (1600 ms) duration. First, short and long durations alter-
nated across trials (N = 8) and participants reported the perceived
duration of a pink oval displayed on the center of the screen. Sec-
ond, short and long durations were randomized and participants
reported the perceived duration of eight IAPS neutral pictures (on
both arousal and valence dimensions). In this second training task,
participants were given feedback about their performance and they
were required to reach 100% of correct answers before continuing
to the next task.
In the time bisection task, we used seven stimulus durations
(400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 ms) and participants
were asked to report if the perceived duration was more similar
to the short or to the long standard duration. The stimuli con-
sisted in four sets of pictures (25.5˚× 21˚). Three sets were chosen
from the IAPS: low-arousing positive pictures (arousal score: 3.8,
valence score: 7.1), high-arousing positive pictures (6.5, 6.5) and
high-arousing negative pictures (6.2, 2.0). The fourth set consisted
of spider pictures1 that were taken from the internet and that were
evaluated by the participants at the end of the experiment using
the same method used to rate the IAPS pictures (Self-Assessment
Manikin, Lang, 1980). This method allowed us to obtain three
mean scores describing the level of arousal, valence, and domina-
tion experienced by participants when confronted with our set of
spider pictures. Responses were given on a 1–9 scale and scores
were recoded so that low and high scores on the arousal dimen-
sion indicate low and high levels of arousal, respectively; on the
valence dimension, low and high scores refer to negative and posi-
tive valence, respectively; and on thedominance dimension, low and
high scores indicate that participants felt controlled or in control
when confronted to the spider pictures.
For the time bisection task, we chose 8 IAPS low-arousing posi-
tive pictures, 8 IAPS high-arousing positive pictures, 24 IAPS high-
arousing negative pictures, and 24 spider pictures. See Appendix
for a list of the IAPS images used. In order to better estimate the BP
in the psychophysical curve, all pictures were shown for each of the
three central time durations (800, 1000, and 1200 ms). To dimin-
ish the number of trials in the session, we reduced the number of
pictures for the two shortest (400 and 600 ms) and the two longest
(1400 and 1600 ms) time durations. Indeed, long and short cat-
egorization was much easier for those time durations compared
to the three central time durations. Table 3 provides the actual
number of trials per condition, for Experiments 1–5.
Overall, across the whole experiment, participants completed a
total of 352 trials, presented in a random order. All stimuli were
displayed on a white background at the center of the screen.
Procedure
The experimental session contained the following tasks. First, par-
ticipants completed three questionnaires in the following order:
Short Depression-Happiness Scale (SDHS, Joseph et al., 2004),
short form of the State Anxiety Inventory (s-STAI, Marteau and
Bekker, 1992), FSQ (Szymanski and O’Donohue, 1995). Second,
they were trained to discriminate between short and long standard
durations, first with the pink oval stimulus and then with IAPS
1The full set of spider images can be requested by contacting the corresponding
author.
neutral pictures. The training trials started with a black fixation
cross displayed on the centre of the screen for a random duration,
varying between 400 and 900 ms. Then, the training-stimulus was
presented for 400 or 1600 ms. Three-hundred milliseconds later,
the message “Was the duration of the oval/image short or long?”
was shown and the participants responded “short” and “long” by
pressing one of two buttons (key 4 or 6), that were counterbal-
anced across participants. Visual feedback (“Correct” or “Wrong
answer”) was provided in the training trials with the neutral IAPS
images.
Third, participants performed the time bisection task that
included a manipulation aimed to induce a sense of control at
the beginning of each trial (see Figure 1). Participants were asked
to choose between one of two keys (1 and 3) to try to decrease the
occurrence of negative images: they were instructed to try to find out
different combinations of keypresses that would yield a high rate
of positive images. Across all experiments, some participants failed
to comply with these instructions (e.g., they pushed just one key
along the whole experiment), and those were not considered for
further analysis. Importantly, there was no contingency between
the selection of one of the two keys and the outcome. Because in
this experiment negative pictures occurred on 75% of the trials,
we expected participants to experience a low level of control over
the image content (i.e., the valence). Each trial started with the
message “Make your choice: 1 or 3” and once one of the two keys
was pressed, the fixation cross was presented for a random inter-
val between 400 and 900 ms. Afterward, an image was displayed
for one of the seven time durations (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200,
1400, and 1600 ms) and 300 ms after the image disappeared, the
message “Was the duration of the image short or long?” was pre-
sented. Participants were asked to judge whether the duration of
the presented image was more similar to the duration of the short
or long standard interval by pressing one of two keys (4 or 6).
A 500 ms blank screen preceded the next trial. Participants com-
pleted 8 blocks of 44 trials, for a total of 352 trials, with a pause
after each block.
At the end of the time bisection task, participants were asked to
respond to the following questions (in order) by means of a contin-
uous scale going from 0 to 100%: (1) how often did positive images
appear?; (2) Did you feel at any point of the experiment that you
had control over the images?; and (3) How liberal are you? Then,
they completed the s-STAI a second time. Afterward, they com-
pleted the Desirability of Control DC Scale (Burger and Cooper,
1979) and finally, they rated the valence, arousal, and domination
for each of the spider pictures by using the nine-point scale of the
Self-Assessment Manikin (Lang, 1980). The entire session lasted
about 50 min.
RESULTS
Questionnaires and evaluation of the spider pictures
Scores from the different questionnaires are reported in Table 1.
Overall, non-anxious participants were not afraid of spiders
(FSQ= 1.9), had relatively low state anxiety levels that did
not significantly vary between the first and second assessment
[STAIs mean before and after the bisection task: 11.5 and 11.9;
t (15)=−0.32, p= 0.75], and were not at risk for depression
(SDQ= 13). At the end of the time bisection task, non-anxious
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the trial events in the experiments.Trials started
with the choice display where participants had to choose either the “1” or
“3” key in order to try to influence the valence of the subsequent image. The
display remained on the screen until a choice was recorded. A fixation display
was then presented for a random interval anywhere between 400 and
900 ms. This variable interval was followed by the presentation of the
emotional picture which was presented for one of seven possible durations
(400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 ms). The image then was
replaced by a blank screen for 300 ms. Then participants were prompted to
categorize the image duration as short of long on the final display.
participants reported that positive images occurred in 29% of the
trials. They considered themselves as being relatively liberal (67%).
More importantly, they reported experiencing very low levels of
control over the image content (13%).
In the evaluation of the spider pictures, the means observed
for the three dimensions of the Self-Assessment Manikin scale,
arousal, valence, and dominance, were 3.8, 5.2, and 5.4, respectively
(see Table 2). Thus, non-anxious participants considered spider
pictures as being low-arousing and neutral in valence. Because
spider pictures were not considered as being positive in valence by
non-anxious participants, for these participants, 25% of images
were highly positive. Notice that participants were quite accurate
at reporting this frequency when they estimated the percentage of
positive images at the end of the experiment (29%)2.
Time bisection task
Temporal judgments for each set of images were examined by
calculating the BPs from the individual psychometric functions
obtained after running a logistic regression. The BP represents
the duration at which the psychophysical curve crosses the “50%
Long” likelihood. To test for temporal distortion effects we ran
two separate ANOVAs on BPs with Valence as within-subjects
factors and compared arousal-matched conditions (IAPS high-
arousing positive images vs. IAPS high-arousing negative images;
and IAPS low-arousing positive images vs. low-arousing neutral
spider images).
The results indicated that for high-arousing stimuli, nega-
tive pictures (BP= 905 ms) were perceived as lasting longer than
positive pictures (BP= 961 ms), F(1,15)= 9.47, p< 0.01, while
for low-arousing stimuli, positive stimuli (BP= 897 ms) were
perceived as lasting longer than neutral stimuli (BP= 957 ms),
F(1,15)= 5.46, p< 0.05 (see Figure 2A).
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1 we tested non-anxious, non-spider-fearful par-
ticipants to measure time distortion effects for different sets of
2Overall, in Experiment 1, participants were shown 37.5% of high-arousing nega-
tive images, 37.5% of low-arousing neutral images, 12.5% of high-arousing positive
images, and 12.5% of low-arousing positive images.
emotional pictures under conditions of low level of experienced
control, including a set of spider images. Including a set of spider
images was important to establish a baseline to compare their per-
formance to that of spider-fearful individuals (Experiment 2). As
expected, with a high proportion of negative pictures (75%) and
the instruction of reducing the proportion of negative images, par-
ticipants experienced very low feelings of control over the events
in the experiment (13%). Importantly, under this condition of low
level control, we successfully replicated previous findings from the
literature with non-anxious individuals for whom the perceived
duration of emotional events is determined by both arousal and
valence (Angrilli et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2011): high-arousing
negative stimuli were perceived as lasting longer than arousal-
matched positive images and low-arousing positive stimuli were
perceived as lasting longer than arousal-matched but less positive
stimuli (neutral spider pictures).
EXPERIMENT 2: 25% OF POSITIVE
IMAGES – SPIDER-FEARFUL INDIVIDUALS
In Experiment 2, we sought to establish a baseline response from
spider-fearful individuals when judging the duration of emotional
images that included a subset of spider images (fear-related stim-
uli), under conditions of low perceived control. This baseline will
serve as a comparison to Experiment 3, in which we increased
the level of perceived control over the images experienced by
spider-fearful participants. The events were identical to those in
Experiment 1. We anticipated temporal distortions to be evident
because of the low levels of perceived control. Specifically, we
expected high-arousing positive images to be perceived as lasting
shorter than both high-arousing negative and spider’s images (i.e.,
BP for positive images would be larger than the ones for negative
and fear-related images).
There is conflicting evidence in the literature regarding how
time is experienced when faced with high-arousing threat stim-
uli compared to high-arousing aversive images. A recent study
found that high-arousing negative images representing disgust
(e.g., mutilated bodies) were overestimated compared to arousal-
matched images representing fear (e.g., attacking animal; Gil
and Droit-Volet, 2012). That said, Tipples (2011) showed that
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Table 1 | Mean scores (standard errors in parentheses) from the experimental questions and questionnaires completed in Experiments 1–5.
Experiment 1 (N =16) Experiment 2 (N =16) Experiment 3 (N =16) Experiment 4 (N =16) Experiment 5 (N =16)
FSQ 1.9 (0.2) 5.6 (0.2) 5.6 (0.2) 5.1 (0.2) 2.1 (0.2)
SDQ 12.8 (0.7) 13.3 (0.7) 14.4 (0.7) 13.4 (0.9) 13.6 (0.8)
STAIs-pre 11.5 (0.9) 12.7 (0.9) 10.4 (0.9) 11.8 (1.2) 11.3 (1.1)
STAIs-post 11.9 (0.7) 15.8 (1.1) 13.3 (0.9) 16.5 (1.1) 12.9 (1.0)
DC 93.1 (2.9) 94.9 (3.5) 98.2 (3.5) 99.8 (3.4) 96.1 (0.4)
% Positive images 28.9 (2.2) 28.2 (2.7) 62.8 (4.4) 63.4 (2.8) 26.1 (2.9)
% Participant in control 12.6 (3.7) 16.1 (4.1) 53.9 (4.4) 11.2 (2.8) 54.6 (5.6)
% Computer in control – – – 85.5 (3.5) –
% Liberal 67.2 (6.2) 67.2 (6.7) 66.2 (5.0) 63.5 (5.2) 65.9 (5.1)
FSQ, Fear of Spider Questionnaire; SDQ, Short Depression-Happiness Scale; STAIs-pre: short form of the State Anxiety Inventory filled out before theTime Bisection
Task; STAIs-post: short form of the State Anxiety Inventory filled out after the Time Bisection Task; DC, Desirability of Control Scale; % Positive images: participants
were asked to report how often did positive images appear in the experiment?; % Participant in control: participants were asked to report if they felt that at any point
in the experiment they felt that they had control over the emotional content of the images; % Computer in Control: participants were asked to report how much
the computer choice influenced the image content (only assessed in Experiment 4); % Liberal: participants were asked to report the extent to which they estimated
themselves as being liberal.
FIGURE 2 | Bisection points in Experiments 1–4 [(A–D), respectively],
as a function of emotional content of image events. Note that when
comparing two bisection points, the smaller bisection point corresponds
to images in that category having been perceived as lasting longer than
the images with a larger bisection point. Error bar indicates the standard
error of the means.
fearful and threatening faces were perceived as lasting the same
amount of time. However, Tipples found that high levels of
fearfulness (as assessed by the Emotionality Activity Sociability
Temperament Survey, Buss and Plomin, 1984) were associated
with higher overestimations of threat-related facial expressions.
This overestimation was driven by participants’ fearfulness and
was independent from other personality variables (e.g., level
of distress, trait anxiety). Therefore, it appears that fear can
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have an independent effect on time perception, separate from
anxiety.
A critical difference between our study and these past stud-
ies was the population tested. Whereas these past studies focused
on normal individuals, we are now interested in investigating these
effects in a highly reactive population of sub-clinical spider-fearful
population. Recent studies have shown that for these individuals,
there is an automatic, overlearned aversive response toward spi-
der pictures. For instance, Buetti et al. (2012) investigated rapid
reaching movements in spider-fearful individuals who were asked
to reach either toward or away from a spider image. In both con-
ditions, participants showed very early avoidance of the spider
images in the execution of the reaching response. The initial seg-
ment of the reaching trajectory in which the effects were observed
is thought to reflect the motor plan assembled prior to movement
execution. Therefore, this finding was interpreted as reflecting
overlearned, automatic motor responses to fear-related images.
Because of the existence of overlearned automatic reactions related
to fear-relevant objects compared to other high-arousing negative
images (e.g., mutilated bodies), one might expect that spider-
fearful participants perceive spider pictures as lasting even longer
than arousal-matched negative stimuli, in line with the results of
Gil and Droit-Volet (2012). On the other hand, if Tipples (2011)
is correct, one might expect that the level of fear of spiders in an
individual will be positively correlated with their temporal over-
estimation of spider images (i.e., negatively correlated with the BP
for spider images).
METHODS
Participants
Sixteen participants from the same pool as in Experiment 1 par-
ticipated in Experiment 2. However, this time we tested 16 sub-
clinical spider-fearful participants (14 females, 2 males, mean age
of 19.9 years, 5.6 of mean at the FSQ).
Stimuli, design, and procedure
Stimuli, design, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.
RESULTS
Questionnaires and evaluation of the spider pictures
Spider-fearful individuals were very scared of spiders (FSQ= 5.6)
and were not at risk for depression (SDQ= 13.3). The level of
state anxiety increased from the first to the second assessment,
indicating that the images presented in the bisection task affected
participant’s anxiety (12.7 vs. 15.8), t (15)=−2.13, p< 0.05. Par-
ticipants reported that positive images occurred on 28% of the
trials. They considered themselves as being relatively liberal (67%).
Importantly, they reported experiencing very low levels of control
over the image content (16%).
As expected, spider pictures were evaluated by spider-fearful
participants as being highly arousing (mean: 6.5), extremely neg-
ative (2.7), and as exerting high domination (3.3). It is important
to note that the set of spider images matched the levels of arousal
and valence of the IAPS high-arousing negative picture set3.
3Overall, spider-fearful participant were shown 25% of highly positive images
(12.5% being low-arousing and 12.5% high-arousing) and 75% of high-arousing
negative images.
The Pearson’s correlations between the mean arousal, valence,
and domination observed at the evaluation of the spider pictures
and the mean at the FSQ, indicated that the more spider-fearful
participants were afraid of spiders the more they felt aroused
(r = 0.54, p= 0.015) and dominated by the aversive pictures
(r =−0.48, p= 0.029), and the more they evaluated the pictures
as being negative (−0.47, p= 0.032), which constitutes a good
validity check for the FSQ score.
Time bisection task
To evaluate whether there was a difference between the three sets
of high-arousing images, we ran an ANOVA on the BPs with Image
type (IAPS-positive, IAPS-negative, spider) as within-subject fac-
tor, remembering that these three groups of images were matched
in overall arousal. The results showed a significant main effect,
F(2,30)= 4.77, p< 0.05. The t -tests indicated that Spider and
IAPS-negative pictures were perceived as lasting the same time
(BP of 927 and 912 ms, respectively), t (15)=−0.64, p= 0.53, but
importantly, both Spider and IAPS-negative pictures were per-
ceived as lasting longer than IAPS-positive pictures (BP of 983 ms),
t (15)= 2.22, p< 0.05 and t (15)= 3.04, p< 0.01, respectively.
Finally, a visual inspection of Figure 2B reveals that the BPs of
positive images from the IAPS were almost identical for high- and
low-arousing positive images. A post hoc comparison confirmed
no significant difference between those two conditions (BP of 983
vs. 988 ms, respectively), t (15)=−0.20, p= 0.85.This post hoc
finding was unexpected and it indicates that for spider-fearful
individuals, perceived duration was only a function of valence
(positive vs. negative), with no contribution from arousal. This
pattern was also replicated in Experiment 4. The BPs for the four
sets of images are shown in Figure 2B.
Finally, we obtained a significant and negative correlation
between scores on the FSQ and BPs for the spider picture set
(r =−0.56, p= 0.012), indicating that the more fearful of spiders
a participant was, the longer she/he overestimated the duration of
spider pictures.
Between experiment comparison (Experiment 1 vs. 2)
Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were exposed to the same sets
of stimuli and both saw 25% of highly positive stimuli. However,
spider-fearful individuals were faced with a higher percentage of
high-arousing negative images than non-anxious individuals (75
vs. 37.5%), half of them representing their object of fear. Thus,
overall, the spider-fearful group was exposed to a more stressful
experimental context than the non-anxious group.
To ensure that the spider-fearful group only differed with
respect to their fear of spiders from the non-anxious group, we
compared their responses on the different questionnaires (means
and standard errors are shown in Table 1). The t -tests clearly
indicated that spider-fearful and non-anxious participants only
differed on the FSQ (the first group being scared of spiders and
the second not), t (30)=−14.19, p< 0.001 and on their level of
state anxiety after performing the time bisection task (spider-
fearful participants showed a higher state anxiety than control
participants after completing the task), t (30)=−3.1, <0.01. The
two groups of participants did not differ on the Short Depression
Questionnaire, t (30)=−0.48, p= 0.63, on the first assessment of
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the State Anxiety Inventory, t (30)=−0.92, p= 0.36, nor on the
DC Scale, t (30)=−0.41, p= 0.69. Furthermore, at the end of the
time bisection task, the two groups reported having been exposed
to a similar percentage of positive images, t (30)= 0.21, p= 0.83,
and having experienced similar levels of perceived control over
the images, t (30)=−0.63, p= 0.53. Finally, we also compared
their performance on the time bisection task on the two sets of
images that were identical across groups: high-arousing positive
and high-arousing negative IAPS pictures. When considering these
two sets of images, non-anxious and spider-fearful participants
showed comparable time distortion effects: an ANOVA on the BPs
for IAPS high-arousing positive and negative images with Group
as between-subjects factor indicated that neither the main effect
of Group was significant (BP of 933 and 948 ms, respectively),
F(1,30)= 0.11, p= 0.75, nor was there an interaction between
valence and Group, F(1,30)= 0.28, p= 0.60.
In spite of the many resemblances between the two groups,
in terms of their initial anxiety, as well as in terms of how they
reacted to the high-arousing IAPS pictures, we observed a fun-
damental change in how these two groups judged time: whereas
non-anxious participants’ time estimates were sensitive to both
arousal and valence, for spider-fearful individuals, time estimates
were only a function of the valence of the image (positive images
were perceived as shorter than negative images). To anticipate
the results of Experiment 4, this difference was not due to the
emotional context in the task, as determined by differences in
the number of negative images the two groups experienced: in
Experiment 4, we found this pattern again, using a very different
emotional context.
Thus, we can conclude that the difference in the pattern
of results was uniquely due to differences in spider-fearfulness
between the two groups.
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 2 we tested time distortion effects in a highly emo-
tional reactive group of participants under conditions of low levels
of perceived of control. Self-report measures of perceived control
confirmed that spider-fearful participants experienced a low level
of control (16%) in the current experiment. The results from the
time bisection task indicated that spider-fearful participants per-
ceived IAPS high-arousing negative images as lasting longer than
IAPS high-arousing positive images, just as non-anxious partic-
ipants did. Supporting previous findings by Tipples (2011), the
temporal overestimation observed for IAPS high-arousing neg-
ative images was similar to the one observed for high-arousing
threat-related images. In addition, the results showed that the more
participants were scared of spiders, the longer was the overestima-
tion of the duration of spider images. This result is consistent with
Tipples’ results that highly fearful participants overestimate the
duration of fearful faces more so than less fearful individuals.
EXPERIMENT 3: 75% OF POSITIVE IMAGES – INCREASED
LEVEL OF CONTROL
Experiments 1 and 2 provided the general framework to test the
hypothesis of most interest to us. We have now established that (a)
our spider images give rise to strong temporal distortion effects
(both in non-anxious and spider-fearful individuals) and further
(b) that the degree of fearfulness toward spiders actually predicts
the magnitude of the temporal distortion experienced by spider-
fearful individuals. Therefore, our paradigm is robust and sensitive
to both the stimulus set that we have chosen and to the person-
ality traits of our participants. The question of interest is then:
can a manipulation aimed at increasing the feeling of control in
this highly reactive population eliminate the temporal distortion
effects observed in Experiment 2? If so, this result would provide
strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that perceived control
can play an emotion buffering effect and minimize the impact of
the emotionality of events on our cognitive processes, as implicitly
indexed by the time perception task (Leotti et al., 2010; Mereu and
Lleras, in press).
To increase the perceived level of control in our participants, we
presented a high proportion of positive images (75%) and a low
proportion of negative images (25%) and asked participants to
maximize the occurrence of positive images. That is, compared to
Experiments 1 and 2, the desired outcome was over-represented in
the world’s events, which should lead to a robust feeling of illusory
control (Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Alloy and Abramson, 1979). It
is important to note that even though we changed the proportion
of positive and negative images, we chose the pictures in a way
that allowed us to keep the mean arousal and valence comparable
across all experiments (see Table 2).
If an increased level of perceived control can buffer the par-
ticipants’ reactions toward aversive stimuli (Leotti et al., 2010),
then one would no longer expect any differences in temporal
estimations (i.e., similar BP) across the four image sets.
METHODS
Participants
Sixteen (new) spider-fearful participants from the same pool as in
Experiment 2 participated in Experiment 3 (16 females, mean age
of 19.1 years, 5.6 of mean at the FSQ).
Stimuli, design, and procedure
The experimental session was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
The images from the IAPS and spider images used in Experiment
3 matched the mean arousal and valence of the images presented
in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 2). See Table 3 for the number
of trials per condition. The procedure was the same as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2 with the exception that participants were instructed
to maximize the occurrence of positive images. At the end of the
session, participants evaluated the spider images using the Self-
Assessment Manikin scale (Lang, 1980), starting with the 8 images
used in this experiment, and later rating an additional 16 spider
images.
RESULTS
Questionnaires and evaluation of the spider pictures
Scores from the different questionnaires are reported in Table 1.
Overall, spider-fearful individuals showed high scores at the FSQ
(5.6) and were not at risk for depression (SDQ= 14.4). The level
of state anxiety increased from the first to the second assessment
(10.4 vs. 13.3), t (15)= 2.84,p= 0.012. At the end of the time bisec-
tion task, spider-fearful participants reported that positive images
occurred in 63% of the trials. Participants also considered them-
selves as being relatively liberal (66%). They evaluated the eight
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Table 2 | Mean arousal and valence (standard deviation shown in parenthesis) of the four image sets used in Experiments 1–5.
Image set Dimension Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 Experiment 5
IAPS high-arousing positive Arousal 6.5 (2.1) 6.5 (2.1) 6.5 (2.1) 6.5 (2.1) 6.5 (2.1)
Valence 6.5 (1.9) 6.5 (1.9) 6.8 (1.8) 6.8 (1.8) 6.5 (1.9)
IAPS high-arousing negative Arousal 6.2 (2.3) 6.2 (2.3) 6.3 (2.4) 6.3 (2.4) 6.2 (2.3)
Valence 2.0 (1.3) 2.0 (1.3) 1.9 (1.3) 1.9 (1.3) 2.0 (1.3)
IAPS low-arousing positive Arousal 3.8 (2.2) 3.8 (2.2) 3.8 (2.2) 3.8 (2.2) 3.8 (2.2)
Valence 7.1 (1.4) 7.1 (1.4) 7.0 (1.5) 7.0 (1.5) 7.1 (1.4)
Spider pictures Arousal 3.8 (1.2) 6.5 (2.1) 6.7 (0.4) 7.4 (0.3) 3.9 (0.3)
Valence 5.2 (1.4) 2.7 (1.4) 1.8 (0.2) 2.2 (0.4) 4.8 (0.3)
Table 3 | Number of trials per condition.
Experiment Time duration
(ms)
IAPS high-arousing
positive
IAPS high-arousing
negative
IAPS low-arousing
positive
Spider
pictures
Experiments 1, 2, 5 400 5 15 5 15
600 5 15 5 15
800 8 24 8 24
1000 8 24 8 24
1200 8 24 8 24
1400 5 15 5 15
1600 5 15 5 15
Experiments 3, 4 400 15 5 15 5
600 15 5 15 5
800 24 8 24 8
1000 24 8 24 8
1200 24 8 24 8
1400 15 5 15 5
1600 15 5 15 5
Note that in Experiments 1, 2, and 5, for the two shortest (400, 600 ms) and longest (1400, 1600 ms) time durations, we randomly selected 15 pictures among the
24 IAPS high-arousing negative pictures as well as 15 pictures among the 24 spider pictures; and for the IAPS high- and low-arousing positive pictures we randomly
selected 5 among the 8 pictures from our set. Similarly, for Experiments 3 and 4, for the two shortest and longest time durations, we randomly selected 5 pictures
among the 8 IAPS high-arousing negative and spider pictures, and 15 pictures among the 24 IAPS high- and low-arousing positive pictures. Appendix 1 shows the list
of the IAPS images used in Experiments 1–5.
experimental spider pictures as being highly arousing (mean: 6.0),
extremely negative (2.2), and as exerting high domination (4.0);
and the whole set as being highly arousing (6.7), extremely negative
(1.8), and as exerting high domination (3.8). Critically, partic-
ipants reported sensing a high level of control over the images
(54%), as we had expected, which was significantly higher than in
Experiments 1 and 2 (ps< 0.001).
Unlike Experiment 2, Pearson’s correlations no longer showed
a significant correlation between participants’ score on the FSQ
and any of the ratings of the spider images (arousal, valence, and
domination, all ps> 0.1). Note that participants rated the images
after having experienced the images during the experiment and
while feeling a high sense of control over the images.
Time bisection task
We ran an ANOVA on the BPs measured for high-arousing images
with Image type (IAPS-positive, IAPS-negative, spider) as within-
subject factor. Unlike Experiment 2, there was no effect of Image
type on the magnitude of the BPs, F(2,30)= 0.22, p= 0.80, see
Figure 2C. The BPs for IAPS-positive, IAPS-negative, and spider
images were 889, 881, and 866 ms, respectively. The BP for IAPS
low-arousing images was 883 ms. As can be seen from the Figure,
there was also no difference in BPs between high-arousing positive
images and low-arousing positive images (BP of 889 vs. 883 ms),
t (15)= 0.27, p= 0.79.
It is critical to our interpretation of this experiment to mea-
sure not only whether the null hypothesis was rejected (it was
not), as in traditional Null Hypothesis Significance Testing, but
more so, to evaluate the degree of adherence to the null hypoth-
esis. To evaluate this, we used Bayesian statistics (see Masson,
2011), and more specifically, we computed pBIC: the probability
that quantifies the evidence in support of the null hypothesis
to any alternative hypothesis, given the data. pBIC for Exper-
iment 3 was 0.996, which according to Raftery (1995) pro-
vides very strong support in favor of the null hypothesis. In
sum, we can confidently conclude that the emotional content of
images in Experiment 3 really had no effect whatsoever on time
perception.
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Finally, in contrast to Experiment 2, Pearson’s correlations indi-
cated no significant correlation between the score on the FSQ and
the BP observed for the spider pictures set (p= 0.21).
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 3 show a substantial contrast with
respect to those obtained in Experiment 2. Not only were there
no temporal distortion effects across image types obtained, but
also, the scores on the Fear of Spider Questionnaire no longer
predicted how participants experienced the duration of the spi-
der images during the experiment, nor how they rated the images
with the Self-Assessment Manikin scale (Lang, 1980) at the end
of the session. Together, these results provide support to our
hypothesis that the feeling of control (even if illusory) buffers
our cognition (as indexed by performance in the time percep-
tion task) from the emotionality of events. Indeed, the effect
of control was restricted to a cognitive measure (time judg-
ments): control did not preempt a rise in anxiety during the
experiment. This result helps us constraint the boundaries of
the buffering effects of perceived control on behavior. That said,
these conclusions can only be seen as preliminary given that
participants actually experienced more positive images in Exper-
iment 3 than in Experiment 2. Thus, the differences in perfor-
mance across the two experiments can be ascribed to either the
increase in perceived control or the increase in the rate of posi-
tive images. Experiment 4 was designed to address this important
confound.
EXPERIMENT 4: 75% OF POSITIVE IMAGES – LOW LEVEL OF
CONTROL
The aim of this experiment was to rule out the possibility that the
absence of an effect of image type on time perception was due to
the overall emotional context of the images in Experiment 3. That
is, in Experiments 1 and 2, where strong effects of image type on
time perception were obtained, the overall rate of positive images
was small (25%), whereas in Experiment 3, where no such effects
were found, the overall rate of positive images was much higher
(75%). Thus, it is possible that when participants find themselves
in an overall “positive” context, that image type no longer affects
time perception. To rule out this possibility, we re-ran Experiment
3 with a small variation aimed at taking away the sense of control
that participants experienced over the images, while maintaining
the same high rate of positive images. To do so, participants in
this experiment were no longer instructed to try to maximize the
occurrence of positive images. Rather, they were told that the com-
puter had an algorithm that was trying to pick as many positive
images as possible and that they were to evaluate the computer’s
success in this endeavor. They were told that the computer would
convey its choice by picking one of two keys and they should sim-
ply press the key chosen by the computer. This manipulation was
proven to diminish feelings of control in non-anxious individuals
on a different study (Mereu and Lleras, in press). As a result, we
expected this manipulation to greatly diminish the participant’s
sense of control over the events, in spite of the high rate of positive
images in the experiment. Because we believe that it is the sense of
control (and not the rate of positive images) that was responsible
for the absence of time distortions in Experiment 3, we predicted
that strong time distortion effects would once again be observed,
replicating the results of Experiment 2.
METHODS
Participants
Sixteen (new) non-anxious participants from the same pool as in
Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 4 (16 females, mean
age of 19.5 years, 5.1 of mean at the FSQ) either in exchange
for credit in a psychology class (2 participants) or for monetary
compensation ($8, 14 participants).
Stimuli, design, and procedure
Stimuli, design, and procedures were the same as in Experiment
3. The only difference between Experiments 3 and 4 was the
instruction given to participants. Instead of being asked to choose
between two keys to try to maximize the occurrence of positive
image, participants were instructed to press the key indicated by
the computer at the start of each trial. They were told that the
computer had an algorithm to try to maximize the occurrence of
positive images from a set of positive and negative images and
that the key represented the computer’s image choice. So, in this
experiment, the trials begun with a display telling them which key
to press (“Press the 1 key”; or “Press the 3 key”). The remain-
ing of the instruction were the same as in Experiment 3, with the
exception that we asked the following four questions at the end of
the time bisection task: (1) How much did the computer choice
influence the image content?; (2) Did you feel at any point of the
experiment that your choices (instead of those of the computer)
influenced the type of images that were presented in the experi-
ment (positive vs. negative images)?; (3) How often did positive
images appear?; 4) How liberal are you?
RESULTS
Questionnaires and evaluation of the spider pictures
Our spider-fearful participants scored high at the FSQ (5.1). They
were not at risk for depression (SDQ= 13.4). The level of state
anxiety was higher in the second than first assessment (STAIS-
s= 16.5 vs. 11.8), t (15)=−3.61, p< 0.01. At the end of the time
bisection task, participants reported that about 63% of the images
in the experiment were positive4. Participants also considered
themselves as being relatively liberal (64%). Participants evaluated
the eight experimental spider pictures as being highly arousing
(mean: 7.3), extremely negative (2.4), and as exerting high dom-
ination (2.7); and the whole set as being highly arousing (7.4),
extremely negative (2.2), and as exerting high domination (2.9).
Critically, they reported that the computer choices were very much
responsible for the valence of the images (86%) in the exper-
iment, whereas they themselves felt very little control over the
experimental events (11%).
As in Experiment 2,Pearson’s correlations between participants’
scores on the FSQ and their ratings of the spider images were
related: the higher the score on the FSQ, the higher they rated
the mean arousal of the spider images (r = 0.45, p= 0.040), and
4Overall participants saw 37.5% of IAPS high-arousing positive images, 37.5% of
IAPS low-arousing positive images, 12.5% of IAPS high-arousing negative images
and 12.5% of high-arousing threatening images.
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the more dominated they felt by the spider images (r =−0.51,
p= 0.023). We did not find a significant correlation between the
FSQ scores and the valence score (r = 0.13, p= 0.31). Finally,
although the FSQ score showed once again a negative correla-
tion with the BPs observed for spider images, in this experiment
that relationship did not reach significance (r =−0.26, p= 0.16).
It is possible that we failed to find a significant correlation here
because of a lack of power.
Time bisection task
We ran an ANOVA on the BPs with Image Type (IAPS-positive,
IAPS-negative, Spiders, with comparable levels of arousal) as
within-subjects factors. The results indicated a significant main
effect, F(2,30)= 4.99, p= 0.013, see Figure 2D. A planned t -test
confirmed no difference between IAPS high-arousing negative
images and high-arousing spider images (BPs 830 and 829 ms),
t (15)= 0.05, p= 0.96. Both sets of high-arousing negative images
were temporally overestimated compared to high-arousing posi-
tive images (BP 930 ms), t (15)= 2.56, p< 0.05 and t (15)= 2.63,
p< 0.02, respectively. Interestingly, as in Experiment 2, temporal
estimations were similar among high- and low-arousing positive
images (BPs 930 and 924 ms), t (15)= 0.24, p= 0.82.
Between experiment comparison (Experiment 2 vs. 4)
A cross-experiment comparison of the two participant groups
showed that the two groups were matched in all respects
(ps> 0.09), except for the reported level of positive images
perceived in the experiment, which was significantly higher in
Experiment 4 than in Experiment 2 (63 vs. 28%), t (30)= 9.10,
p< 0.001.
With respect to performance on the time bisection task for
high-arousing images, we ran an ANOVA on BPs with Image
type (IAPS-positive, IAPS-negative, and spider) as within-subjects
factors and Experiment as between-subject factor. As before, the
results showed that a main effect of Image type, F(2,60)= 9.29,
p< 0.001. More importantly, the main effect of Experiment and
the interaction between Experiment and Image type were not sig-
nificant (Fs< 0.56). Furthermore, the BPs for the four sets of
images did not differ between Experiment 2 and 4 (ps> 0.1).
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiment
2, in spite of the large difference in the rate of positive images that
participants experienced during the time bisection task. That is,
in both experiments, spider-fearful participants experienced large
time distortion effects that were driven uniquely by the valence of
the images: negative images were perceived as lasting longer than
positive images, and both sets of positive images were perceived in
similar (shorter) fashion, in spite of the large difference in arousal
between these two sets of images. We can now confidently conclude
that the overall emotional context of the images in an experiment
(few vs. many positive images) does not fundamentally alter the
direction of the time distortion effects experienced by our partic-
ipants. More importantly, the results of Experiment 3 can now be
more clearly interpreted: we can confidently argue that it was the
increase in participants’ feelings of control over the experimental
events that eliminated the temporal distortions in that experiment
(and not the high rate of positive images).
In sum, we have found strong evidence in favor of the hypoth-
esis that the perception of control over emotional events can
have a buffering effect over our cognitive assessments of those
events, as indexed here by performance on the time bisection task.
That said, this buffering effect did not extend to anxiety: across
experiments, and irrespective of the level of control, our spider-
fearful participants consistently felt more anxious after being faced
with the spider images in the time bisection task, than before.
No such increase was found with non-anxious, non-spider-fearful
individuals (Experiment 1). Experiment 5 was designed as a final
test of the effects of control on the interaction between cognition
and emotion.
EXPERIMENT 5: HIGH LEVEL OF CONTROL AND COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE
In Experiments 1–3, the participants’ task was consistent with the
participants’ general inner goals. That is, participants were asked
to minimize negative events or maximize positive events, which
are both goals that are compatible with a human being’s general
aim of maintaining or moving toward a positive state of wellbeing
(e.g., Thorndike, 1933). When participants felt successful in the
choice task (Experiment 3), this sense of achievement was com-
patible with their personal desires of avoiding negative states and
aversive events. Under these conditions, their sense of control pro-
duced a buffering effect such that the emotionality of events no
longer influenced their cognitive decisions in the time bisection
task. At first glance, one may want to conclude that in general a
sense of control will always have a positive effect on our cogni-
tion. However, it is easy to design a scenario where participants
feel in control over the events, yet, those events lead to a negative
internal state. Take for example the instruction: “Try to maxi-
mize the occurrence of negative images.” Perceived success in this
task would lead participants to feel responsible for all the highly
aversive images that they are seeing, which presumably, at some
level, they do not want to, see. This state of cognitive dissonance
may over-ride the otherwise positive effects of perceived control
on cognition. Experiment 5 tested this condition in non-anxious,
non-spider-fearful participants.
All experimental procedures were identical to those in Experi-
ment 1, with the single exception of the change in instructions. If
a sense of control can over-ride the state of cognitive dissonance,
one would expect (a) that participants will feel a high level of con-
trol and (b) that this simple change in instructions would lead to
the absence of time distortion effects (i.e., similar BPs across image
sets), even though everything about the procedure and images is
identical to Experiment 1, where robust distortion effects were
found. If, on the other hand, the state of cognitive dissonance pre-
vents the sense of control from providing some buffering to the
participants, then one might expect to replicate Experiment 1 and
obtain large distortion effects, in spite of participants having a
large sense of control over the experimental events.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 16 non-anxious participants from the same pool as in
Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 5 (16 females, mean age
of 19.1 years, 2.1 of mean at the FSQ). We should note that six
www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 337 | 11
Buetti and Lleras Perceived control over fear-related images
of our participants had to be replaced. One because she scored
too high on the FSQ (5.6) and we wanted to only test non-
spider-fearful individuals. Five others were excluded because our
instruction manipulation failed to induce a sense of control in
them (scores at or near 0%).
Stimuli, design, and procedure
Stimuli, design, and procedures were the same as in Experiment
1. The only difference between Experiments 5 and 1 was the
instruction given to participants. Instead of being asked to choose
between two keys to try to maximize the occurrence of positive
image, participants were told to try to maximize the occurrence of
negative events. Because positive events occurred rarely (25%), we
anticipated participants would feel a high level of control over the
image content.
RESULTS
Questionnaires and evaluation of the spider pictures
The non-anxious participants were not scared of spiders
(FSQ= 2.1) and were not at risk of depression (SDQ= 13.6). The
levels of state anxiety were marginally higher during the second
than the first assessment (12.9 vs. 11.3), t (20)=−1.92, p= 0.069.
After the time bisection task, participants reported that 26% of the
images in the experiment were positive. Participants considered
themselves relatively liberal (66%). The evaluation of the spider
pictures indicated that they considered the spider images as being
low-arousing (3.9), as being neutral (4.8), and as producing mod-
erate feelings of domination (5.5). Critically, participants reported
sensing a high level of control over the images (55%).
Time bisection task
To test time for distortion effects we ran two separate ANOVAs on
BPs with Valence as within-subjects factors and compared arousal-
matched conditions (IAPS high-arousing positive images vs. IAPS
high-arousing negative images; and IAPS low-arousing positive
images vs. low-arousing neutral spider images).
The results indicated that despite the high level of perceived
control, high-arousing negative images were still perceived as
lasting longer than arousal-matched positive images (BPs 858
vs. 941 ms, respectively), F(1,15)= 6.89, p= 0.019. On the other
hand, BPs did not significantly differ between low-arousing posi-
tive and neutral (spiders) images (BPs 948 vs. 899 ms, respectively),
F(1,15)= 1.71, p= 0.21 (see Figure 3). A visual inspection of the
results also suggested that we should do a post hoc analysis to com-
pare BPs of positive images (high arousal vs. low arousal). Unlike
Experiment 1, this comparison revealed no significant difference
between these two conditions, t (15)=−0.29, p= 0.78. In sum,
this pattern of results shows that a significant temporal distortion
effect was observed only for high-arousing negative IAPS pictures.
Between experiment comparison (Experiment 1 vs. 5)
A cross-experiment comparison of the two participant groups,
showed that the two groups were matched in all respects
(ps> 0.42), except for their level of perceived control over the
events, which was significantly higher in Experiment 5 (55%)
than in Experiment 1 (13%), t (30)= 6.24, p< 0.001. We ran two
ANOVAs on BPs withValence as within-subjects factors and Exper-
iment as between-subject factor for each level of arousal separately
FIGURE 3 | Bisection points in Experiment 5 as a function of the
emotional content of the image events.
(high and low). For high-arousing images, the results indicated
that only the main effect of Valence was significant: negative images
were perceived as lasting longer compared to positive images (BPs
881 vs. 951 ms, respectively),F(1,30)= 14.49,p< 0.001. The main
effect of Experiment and the interaction between Valence and
Experiment did not reach significance (Fs< 0.56).
For low-arousing images, the BPs did not differ between Exper-
iments 1 and 5 (BPs 927 vs. 924 ms, respectively) and between
positive and neutral images (BPs 922 vs. 928 ms, respectively),
Fs< .0.07, ps> 0.79. However, the interaction between Valence
and Experiment was significant, F(1,30)= 5.79, p= 0.022, indi-
cating that participants experienced low arousal images in a
different fashion across the two experiments: whereas in Exper-
iment 1, positive images were perceived as lasting longer than
negative images, that time distortion effect was not observed in
Experiment 5.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 5 provided a qualified answer to the
question: does perceived control help cognition under conditions
of cognitive dissonance? We successfully induced a sense of control
in our participants, in spite of the cognitive dissonance that they
certainly experienced. With this high sense of control, participants
experienced temporal distortions in only one condition: high-
arousing negative images were perceived as lasting longer than
the other image types. In other words, perceived control seemed
to inoculate participants from experiencing temporal distortions
when viewing low-arousing images. But at high levels of arousal,
the valence of the images did alter how subjects experienced them.
Overall, comparing Experiments 1 and 5, the results suggest
that experiencing heightened levels of control once again affected
the manner in which we processed emotional events. That said,
the effects of control were less strong than in Experiment 3, and
the critical difference was the goal state of the task: in Experiment
3, participants tried to achieve a positive goal, whereas here, they
maximized the occurrence of a negative outcome. Thus the man-
ner in which one elicits control seems to be critical in determining
the effect that control will have on cognitive processing, when faced
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with emotional events. This makes sense because the perception of
control is generally considered to be a positive illusion (Taylor and
Brown, 1988, 1994), with the adaptive role of moving individuals
toward positive moods and states. Thus, the task in Experiment 5
clashes with this adaptive role of experiencing control: asking par-
ticipants to maximize the number of aversive events puts them in
“control” of an environmental situation that is moving them away
from a desirable end state (positive mood). From this perspective,
it is actually quite remarkable that experiencing control actually
had any effects on participants at all.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to test the hypothesis that having
a sense of subjective control over experimental emotional events
alters the way humans judge the duration of those events. We
predicted that having a sense of control would work as an emo-
tional buffer, blocking the effects of emotionality on our cognitive
processes (Leotti et al., 2010; Mereu and Lleras, in press). As a
strong test of this hypothesis, we chose a population that is very
emotionally reactive (sub-clinical spider-fearful individuals) and
used fear-related images as stimuli in the time perception task.
Our results demonstrated that experiencing a sense of control over
the emotional events changed the way these participants judged
the duration of those events: whereas in situations of little-to-no
control (Experiments 2 and 4), their judgments were influenced
by the valence of images (negative images judged to be longer
than positive images), once we elicited a sense of control in these
participants, the effect of valence on their temporal judgments
was eliminated. In fact, when participants experienced little-to-no
control, their fearfulness of spiders predicted the time distortion
effects, and this correlation was eliminated under conditions of
high levels of perceived control.
Two important qualifying results to our conclusions were
found. First, whereas the experience of control had a positive
effect on cognition (as indexed by performance in the time per-
ception task), it did not change participants’ anxious response to
the images: consistently, our spider-fearful participants felt signif-
icantly more anxious after the time perception task than before.
This finding was robust to differences in the overall emotional con-
texts of the tasks (in Experiment 2, 75% of images were negative
whereas in Experiment 4, 75% were positive) and to the vary-
ing sense of control that participants experienced (low control in
Experiments 2 and 4, high control in Experiment 3). This find-
ing is consistent with prior findings indicating that the experience
of control does not necessarily alter all aspects of our responses
to stressing stimuli: the overall estimation of pain and stress is
not impacted by the experience of control (Pervin, 1963; Stotland
and Blumenthal, 1964; Glass et al., 1969). And whereas control
can decrease arousal on the interval preceding the stressful event,
no straightforward effect of control has been found on the phys-
iological response to stressors during the stimulation itself (e.g.,
Corah and Boffa, 1970; Geer et al., 1970; Geer and Maisel, 1972;
Gatchel and Proctor, 1976). It is worth remembering that our par-
ticipants in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were sub-clinical spider-fearful
and thus had a life-long, well established aversion toward spiders.
In that sense, it is not a surprise that they consistently reported
being more anxious at the end of the experimental session (after
being confronted with spider images) than at the beginning. The
s-STAI questionnaire (Marteau and Bekker, 1992) that we used
is an explicit self-assessment tool to measure state anxiety and
therefore it is subject to response biases. As a result, the s-STAI
scores may not have been sufficiently sensitive to measure specific
responses that participants had to specific spider images through-
out the experiment. These phasic anxiety responses may have been
modulated by perceived control on a trial by trial basis, but we had
no way of measuring such effects. Follow-up studies using differ-
ent anxiety measuring techniques as well as physiological arousal
measures are warranted to better assess the impact of perceived
control on anxiety. On the positive side, the time perception task
represents an implicit measure of the effects of emotional stimuli
on our participants’ cognitive system. Participants were not asked
directly to judge or respond to the emotionality of each image in
the task, they simply reported whether the image duration seemed
closest to the shorter or to the longer standards. This implicit
measure successfully showed an effect of perceived control on the
cognitive task of time estimation.
A second qualifying result to our overall conclusion that a sense
of control can protect our cognitive processes (here, time judg-
ments) from the usual effects of emotional stimuli relates to the
conditions in which the sense of control is obtained. Given that,
in our experiments, eliciting a sense of control depends on ask-
ing participants to exert a choice, the choice must be one that
seeks to obtain an outcome aligned with participants’ inner sense
of wellbeing. When participants are asked to seek goals that run
counter to their wellbeing (Experiment 5), the effects of con-
trol are diminished and the emotionality of events does seem to
end up altering cognition (at least for high-arousing stimuli). Put
simply, the experience of control is not a magic bullet: simply
asking participants to play an active role in emotional situations
will not ensure that emotions will not influence their cognitive
mechanisms.
TIME PERCEPTION
Models of time perception differ on whether they posit the exis-
tence of an internal clock (or pacemaker) that can be sampled to
estimate time (e.g., Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984) or whether
they do without an internal clock (Church and Broadbent, 1990;
Matell and Meck, 2004). Though the existence of an internal
clock is a matter of debate (see Gorea, 2011), the vast majority
of the literature on time perception uses the SET model which
does incorporate an internal clock (Gibbon et al., 1984). Within
this framework, temporal distortions are easily modeled: they can
arise because the internal clock has changed its ticking rate (typ-
ically, an effect ascribed to manipulations of arousal) or because
the extent to which one can attend to the counting process itself
has been manipulated. That is, if we seldom pay attention to the
counting process, then time will appear to have gone quickly (few
samples were taken), if we often pay attention to the counting
process, then time will appear to slow down (many tic samples
were taken).
Droit-Volet and colleagues (e.g., Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Droit-
Volet and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009) have published
substantially on the topic of how emotions affect our estima-
tion of time. The results obtained in this literature are as follows:
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for high-arousing events, negative events are perceived as last-
ing longer than positive events because of attentional avoidance.
When faced with highly aversive stimuli, our attention quickly
turns inward, and the counting process begins quickly. In contrast,
high-arousing positive events do not cause this quick avoidance
reaction, and thus less attention is available for time estimation. In
contrast, for low-arousing images, the effects are reversed. Neg-
ative images actually tend to capture attention. But, given the
absence of threat in the environment, there is no need to quickly
disengage from the image, which delays attention to the counting
process. More recent studies have started to better differentiate dif-
ferent types of aversive stimuli: fear, disgust, threat are now being
considered independently (Tipples, 2011; Gil and Droit-Volet,
2012).
Within the framework proposed by Droit-Volet et al. (2004)
the effect of perceived control on time perception fits best with
an “attentional locus.” It is as if, under high levels of perceived
control in Experiment 3, participants can better engage and disen-
gage from the images, or at least do so in a similar fashion across
all image types. Perhaps, success in the control task allows partic-
ipants to focus on a positive aspect of their ongoing experience
(their success), allowing them to be less vulnerable to the atten-
tional pull of emotional events. We hasten to add that the task we
used to induce the feeling of control (“maximize events of type X”)
was the same across all experiments. Thus, it is not the inclusion
of this new task that changed the attentional engagement to the
various images, but the perceived level of success in that task. Fur-
ther, when control was high, but the experience was not positive
(Experiment 5), perceived control did not fully protect partici-
pants against temporal distortions. Overall, it is possible that the
“buffering” effect proposed by Leotti et al. (2010) is attentional
in nature: when we feel in control, we might attend differently to
world events. This issue is now the focus of investigation in our
laboratory.
Our results provide an important contribution to the time
perception literature. First, Experiment 1 replicated the stan-
dard modulations of time judgments by valence and arousal
(Angrilli et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2011). Furthermore, the results
of Experiments 2 and 4 provide additional support regarding
the stability of these effects: the overall emotional context of a
task does not impact the specific effect of image type on BPs.
That is, both when negative events were frequent and when they
were rare, the valence of the image being judged on a given
trial determined whether this image would be perceived as rel-
atively longer or shorter than other image types in that experi-
ment. Another important result from our experiments was the
replication of Tipples’ (2011) observation that individual differ-
ences in fearfulness predict differences in time perception: the
more fearful participants were of spiders, the longer they per-
ceived the duration of spider images. This finding was obtained
when participants felt little-to-no control over experimental
events.
Finally, the results of Experiments 2 and 4 represent a new
departure from the literature on one important point: we twice
failed to, see an effect of arousal on the perceived duration of pos-
itive images. That is, whereas it is typically observed that highly
arousing positive images are perceived as lasting a short time and
low-arousing positive images as lasting a relatively longer period
of time, here we found no such difference. In fact, our results
suggested that our participants’ perception of time was entirely
driven by valence, with positive events being judged as lasting
shorter than both aversive and threatening events. We can specu-
late that our participants were probably highly aroused throughout
the experiment because of the anticipation of having to face spider
pictures (in an unpredictable fashion). Thus, perhaps all events
were perceived as occurring in a state of high arousal. If that is
true, then that would explain why only an effect of valence was
found.
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT FINDINGS
There are several potential limitations to this study that should
be acknowledged. First, with respect to the selection of stimuli,
McGraw et al. (2010) recently published a study showing that
bipolar scales for measuring emotional valence (as it is done in
the IAPS ratings) are inappropriate because they do not reflect the
psychological difference in intensity between positive and neg-
ative emotions. That is, a score of 3 in the IAPS valence scale
is 2 units away from the neutral point in the scale (5), but the
intensity of this negative emotion is larger than the intensity of
a positive image with a score of 7. Thus, it is possible that our
group of negative images were therefore psychologically more
intense than the groups of positive images. Fortunately, the main
point of the current paper does not rest on perfectly equating
valences across image sets. Rather, our design and experimental
logic lay on the direct comparison of performance by partici-
pants looking at the exact same images (see comparison between
Experiments 3 and 4). Thus, the key in the logic is that emo-
tional images that usually produce distortions in time percep-
tion (as we verified in Experiments 1, 2, and 4) failed to do so
when one judges them under conditions of high perceived control
(Experiment 3).
The between-subject structure of our design also presents lim-
itations to the current findings. Although we successfully equal-
ized the participant groups across experiments, experiments were
run at different times during the semester and some partici-
pants received monetary compensation for participation. Thus,
one cannot be entirely certain that there were not “unmea-
sured” differences between groups. To assuage these concerns,
we should point out that our results replicated previous results
in the literature (Experiment 1 replicates Angrilli et al., 1997;
Smith et al., 2011), and also replicated within this study (Exper-
iments 2 and 4). Thus, we can feel confident that our results are
robust and replicable. We should also note that the null result
we obtained in Experiment 3 should be interpreted with a mea-
sure of caution. Even though we (a) predicted a null result, (b)
replicated a null result from a different study (Mereu and Lleras,
in press), and (c) provided a quantitative measure to estimate
the adherence of the null hypothesis (Masson, 2011), one can
never be certain as to the reasons why a null result is found in
an experiment.
CONCLUSION
In this manuscript, we studied one way in which emotions can
impact cognition, specifically, how the emotional content of an
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event alters how we estimate the duration of that event. Such
time distortions have been interpreted as a negative effect of emo-
tions on cognitive processing: the emotionality of an event alters
the manner in which our attention system engages in the task of
counting time. Here, we demonstrated that the manner in which
participants engage with the stimuli can significantly modulate
this deleterious effect of emotions on cognitive processing: when
participants feel a high degree of control over the emotionality
of events in the experiment, they seem to better control their
attention system, such that the emotionality of the image no longer
impacts their cognitive assessment of that image. Given that in
most if not all current experiments investigating the effects of
emotion on cognition, participants are put into a situation where
they have no control over the emotional events in the experi-
ment, our results indicate that it may be worthwhile and fruitful
to study the impact of emotion on cognition in situations where
participants can feel some degree of control over the emotional
events.
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APPENDIX
List of the IAPS images (Lang et al., 2008) used in Experiments 1–5.
In Experiments 1, 2, and 5 we chose 8 low-arousing positive pictures (1441, 1450, 1600, 2057, 5030, 5040, 5210, 5725), 8 high-arousing
positive pictures (4607, 4647, 4649, 4651, 4652, 4656, 4668, 4670), and 24 high-arousing negative pictures (3000, 3001, 3010, 3030, 3053,
3061, 3062, 3063, 3064, 3068, 3071, 3101, 3103, 3120, 3131, 3140, 3150, 3168, 3185, 3190, 3191, 3225, 3250, 3261).
In Experiments 3–4 we chose 24 low-arousing positive pictures (1333, 1419, 1441, 1450, 1600, 1602, 1620, 2040, 2057, 2060, 2153,
2302, 2304, 2306, 2358, 2388, 5001, 5030, 5040, 5210, 5725, 5764, 5831, 7325), 24 high-arousing positive pictures (4607, 4608, 4611, 4631,
4647, 4649, 4651, 4652, 4656, 4664, 4668, 4670, 5621, 5629, 7405, 8033, 8080, 8179, 8180, 8185, 8186, 8370, 8490, 8492), 8 high-arousing
negative pictures (3000, 3001, 3010, 3030, 3061, 3062, 3150, 3168).
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